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Constitutional Law: 
Reliance on Nonenforcement 
 
Zachary S. Price1 
 
When, if ever, may private parties rely on official assurances that 
federal law will not apply to them? This question arises in a bewildering 
array of contexts, from humdrum to monumental. At the most everyday 
level, federal park police might promise to allow parking in a no-parking 
zone only to return with a ticket, or harried Internal Revenue Service 
personnel might provide mistaken guidance on how to complete a tax 
return. But other assurances are more consequential. Federal law 
enforcement and intelligence officials may promise undercover agents 
immunity from prosecution for joining a criminal operation as a means 
of uncovering crimes; some federal agencies issue no-action letters or 
advisory opinions indicating that planned conduct will not be punished; 
and a panoply of administrative agencies issue enforcement policies 
indicating how they plan to enforce the many detailed statutes and 
regulations they administer. 
In particularly dramatic exercises of this power, the Obama 
Administration publicly announced extensive nonenforcement policies 
regarding both marijuana and immigration. Although possessing or 
distributing marijuana remains a federal crime, the Department of Justice 
issued guidance indicating that federal prosecutors generally would not 
devote resources to enforcing federal narcotics laws against parties 
operating in compliance with state law. Similarly, in two controversial 
programs (one ultimately blocked by a preliminary injunction), the 
Department of Homeland Security invited broad categories of 
undocumented immigrants to apply for “deferred action,” a two- or 
three-year promise of non-deportation that entailed eligibility for work 
authorization and other potential benefits. The Trump Administration has 
revoked this marijuana guidance. It hopes also to terminate the Obama 
Administration’s deferred action program, although a court has 
temporarily barred it from doing so. Yet the Trump Administration itself 
has slackened enforcement in many areas of regulation, from 
environmental law to healthcare and labor, that might well encourage 
reliance by regulated parties. 
All such policies raise difficult reliance concerns because such 
policies, like other nonenforcement promises, are formally nonbinding: 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and adapted from Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (2017). 
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in the marijuana and immigration examples, for instance, the policy 
documents made clear that they guaranteed nothing. Yet as a practical 
matter, such policies may well encourage legal violations. Again, the 
marijuana and immigration policies dramatically illustrate the point: both 
policies effectively invited millions of people, many of them legally 
unsophisticated, to take significant legal risks. If the government resumes 
enforcement, marijuana entrepreneurs could be guilty of multiple federal 
crimes with stiff penalties, while deferred action applicants will have 
provided the government with a removal case “on a platter,” as one 
scholar has put it.2 
At present, this reliance question is governed by an untidy and 
undertheorized set of cases holding that due process bars enforcement in 
some circumstances of reliance but not in others. I offer here an account 
of this case law and propose an organizing principle for the doctrine. 
Although key decisions have often framed the issue in terms of intuitive 
unfairness, in fact, reliance defenses require balancing separation of 
powers concerns against considerations of individual fair notice. On the 
one hand, protecting individual reliance on promised nonenforcement 
would enable executive officials to wipe away substantive laws, a result 
that would defy the basic separation of powers principle that executive 
officials can alter substantive legal obligations only if Congress has 
delegated authority to do so. On the other hand, failing to protect 
individual reliance risks punishing individuals for conduct that they 
lacked fair notice was subject to sanction. 
On the whole, without quite framing the issue in these terms, existing 
case law has struck this balance in favor of enforceability and against 
individual reliance, while at the same time carving out a narrow 
exception in some cases when enforcement officials invited unlawful 
conduct with assurances of legality rather than mere promises of 
nonenforcement. Federal courts thus have sometimes protected reliance 
when official assurances involved at least an apparent exercise of 
delegated interpretive authority to determine legal meaning or when 
executive officials held authority to enlist private parties in government 
operations not subject to generally applicable legal prohibitions. In 
contrast, courts have generally rejected reliance on promised 
nonenforcement—even when doing so results in acute unfairness—when 
officials made no representation that conduct was lawful and promised 
only to exercise their discretion not to prosecute. 
                                                 
 2. Mary D. Fan, Legalization Conflicts and Reliance Defenses, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 907, 939-40 (2015). 
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Far from tracking any intuitive notion of fundamental fairness, this 
pattern of case results ultimately reflects the important separation-of-
powers principle, accepted even by most proponents of broad 
nonenforcement policies, that enforcement discretion entails authority to 
ignore completed violations but not to excuse, in advance, future ones. 
With the doctrine framed in these terms, I give it an uneasy defense. 
Historically, executive authority to cancel legal prohibitions was known 
as the “suspending” or “dispensing” power, and though English 
monarchs exercised this authority, the Constitution repudiates it by 
requiring that Presidents “faithfully execute[]” federal laws. This anti-
suspending rule—that, absent more specific legislative delegation, 
executive officials have discretion over which violations to pursue, but 
not over whether conduct violates the law in the first place—forms an 
important constitutional background principle against which Congress 
legislates. The principle preserves ultimate legislative responsibility for 
the content of law (or at least the scope of interpretive delegations to 
executive agencies), and it enables creation of regulatory structures that 
leverage limited enforcement resources to achieve broader societal 
compliance with substantive law. 
A broad reliance defense would undermine this separation-of-powers 
principle by creating a legislatively unauthorized suspending power by 
operation of due process: executive officials could eliminate legal 
prohibitions simply by inducing reliance on promised nonenforcement. 
Courts have properly precluded this result by cabining the contexts in 
which reliance will receive legal protection. To put the point most 
sharply, individuals who accept any invitation by the President or 
executive officials to undertake illegal conduct must do so at their peril. 
Due process cannot normally shield them from future enforcement. 
Yet if limits on reliance defenses thus advance separation-of-powers 
values, framing reliance defenses in terms of a balance between fair 
notice and separation of powers may help identify additional contexts, 
like cases involving mistaken assurances of legality, in which the balance 
should tip the other way. This inquiry carries the inevitable imprecision 
of all incommensurate balancing tests: it involves, to some degree, 
assessing “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is 
heavy.”3 Nevertheless, I suggest several types of cases in which more 
limited separation-of-powers costs or more acute fairness concerns may 
justify broader legal protection for reliance. 
                                                 
 3. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing a balancing test as applied to the dormant Commerce 
Clause). 
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Civil and Administrative Estoppel: One limited reform is that 
federal courts should reconsider their current hostility to case-specific 
estoppel claims outside the criminal context. Lower courts appear to 
have applied the due process defense based on mistaken legal assurances 
only in criminal cases. More generally, despite the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to close the door completely on civil and administrative estoppel, 
federal courts almost never accept such claims. Some recent “fair notice” 
cases in the administrative context, however, have drawn lines similar to 
those suggested by criminal due process case law, and in any event the 
same due process principles of fair warning should logically extend 
beyond criminal law to other penal sanctions. An analogous defense thus 
should apply in appropriate civil- and administrative-penalty cases—
albeit with the same limits and qualifications as in the criminal context. 
Thus, to be concrete, in limited circumstances when regulated parties can 
plausibly claim genuine confusion about the law, even formally 
nonbinding no-action letters and advisory opinions from enforcement 
agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission might sometimes 
support an anti-entrapment estoppel defense. So too should assurances 
provided through IRS help lines and other official sources accessible to 
everyday citizens seeking to comply with the law as best they can. 
Provision of Information: When the government obtains 
information by assuring nonenforcement, due process principles of fair 
notice should limit the government’s use of that information in future 
enforcement efforts. That is so because, in this context, fairness concerns 
are particularly acute, while the cost of transgressing the separation of 
powers is limited when the government may still pursue the substantive 
violations in question by other means. For example, to apply for deferred 
action under the Obama Administration’s programs, individual 
immigrants were required to provide identifying information, such as 
their names and addresses, and document that they met specified 
eligibility criteria. Immigrants provided such information, which 
effectively handed the government a deportation case against them, 
based on assurances the information would not be used against them. 
Though formally nonbinding, such assurances invited reliance in a far 
more focused and consequential way than a typical nonenforcement 
policy, and allowing use of such information is not necessary to preserve 
the primacy of underlying substantive laws over revocable enforcement 
policies: power to revoke deferred action itself suffices to prevent a de 
facto suspension of statutory requirements. Accordingly, due process 
should generally bar using application information against beneficiaries 
of these deferred-action programs. 
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Secondary Violations: A reliance defense might also be plausible 
with respect to legal prohibitions ancillary to the primary prohibition that 
executive officials indicated they were unlikely to enforce. The federal 
Controlled Substances Act, for example, not only prohibits possession 
and distribution of controlled substances—including marijuana—but also 
prohibits knowingly and intentionally leasing or otherwise making 
property available for use in drug operations. The government has 
accordingly threatened landlords with criminal prosecution, civil 
penalties, or forfeiture based on tenants’ operation of illegal businesses, 
including state-licensed marijuana dispensaries, on their property. Much 
as with information disclosure, however, individual reliance interests are 
acute in this context, as the federal government’s marijuana 
nonenforcement policy may have led landlords and others to perceive 
entering leases or other contracts with marijuana dispensaries as no 
different from doing so with respect to other ostensibly lawful 
businesses. At the same time, the separation-of-powers costs to 
protecting reliance are attenuated given the government’s ability to 
vindicate statutory policies by pursuing those who have violated the law 
directly. Thus, again, at least in suitably compelling cases, the claim of 
individual unfairness should prevail over countervailing separation-of-
powers concerns about executive licensing of unlawful conduct. 
Congressional Nonenforcement: A further implication of my 
analysis is that courts should recognize broader reliance defenses with 
respect to congressionally mandated nonenforcement, as opposed to 
nonenforcement adopted by enforcement agencies on their own 
initiative. If anxieties about enabling executive dispensations from 
substantive law properly explain courts’ reluctance to recognize reliance 
defenses based on nonenforcement decisions, courts should be more 
solicitous of individual fairness concerns—and thus more willing to 
recognize legal protections for reliance—when such separation of powers 
anxieties are inapplicable because Congress, rather than the executive 
branch alone, has mandated the nonenforcement. Congress does so 
routinely by denying appropriations to enforce disfavored regulations, 
and it has done so recently through recurrent riders barring the use of 
Justice Department funds to prosecute state-compliant medical marijuana 
users and distributors. Because Congress may sometimes have sound 
reasons to proceed through appropriations rather than substantive legal 
changes, a blanket estoppel rule would be inappropriate in this context. 
Courts may, however, consider reliance claims case-by-case and protect 
reliance when it was reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Policy-based Desuetude: Due process may also protect reliance 
when an overt nonenforcement policy has persisted without change or 
apparent violation over an extended period of time. As we have seen, the 
balance between separation of powers compliance and individual 
reliance generally must favor the former at the expense of the latter, so as 
to avoid creating an executive suspending power by operation of due 
process. At some point, however, the balance should tip the other way, at 
least with respect to malum prohibitum offenses like drug prohibition. If 
the government effectively creates a settled expectation of legality by 
adhering over a lengthy period to an overt policy of nonenforcement, due 
process should eventually bar retrospective enforcement in violation of 
the policy—notwithstanding the significant cost to congressional 
lawmaking authority that results. Accordingly, had the Trump 
Administration (or a Clinton Administration) chosen to continue the 
Obama Administration’s marijuana and immigration policies instead of 
revoking them, courts might have concluded after a sufficiently lengthy 
period (I propose fifteen years) that due process precluded disruption of 
resulting nonenforcement expectations. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Due process principles may thus mitigate at the margins some harsh 
effects of the general rule that nonenforcement reliance cannot receive 
constitutional protection. The tradeoffs involved in balancing fairness 
and separation of powers are necessarily messy and contestable. As a 
general matter, as courts have by and large recognized, this balance 
should tilt against protecting reliance. Protecting individual reliance in all 
cases, or even when concerns about fair notice are substantial, would 
undermine important legal limits on enforcement officials’ authority by 
giving them effective power to authorize legal violations. Nevertheless, 
in at least some situations—when the government pursues violations 
despite authoritatively deeming conduct lawful; when it relies on 
particular information obtained by promising nonenforcement, or when it 
pursues violations prohibited only as a secondary means of implementing 
unenforced primary prohibitions; when Congress, rather than an 
enforcement agency alone, has mandated nonenforcement; or when an 
overt nonenforcement policy has persisted without revision or salient 
violations for an extended period—the balance should tip the other way 
and give due process protection to reliance. 
 
 
